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3.1 Introduction
A cup of tea, left to its own, cools down while the surrounding air heats
up until both have reached the same temperature, and a gas, confined
to the left half of a room, uniformly spreads over the entire available
space as soon as the confining wall is removed. Thermodynamics (TD)
characterises such process in terms of an increase of thermodynamic en-
tropy, which attains its maximum value at equilibrium, and the Second
Law of thermodynamics posits that in an isolated system entropy can-
not decrease. The aim of statistical mechanics (SM) is to explain the
behaviour of these systems, in particular its conformity with the Second
Law, in terms of the dynamical laws governing the individual molecules
of which they are made up. In what follows these laws are assumed to
be the ones of classical mechanics.
An influential suggestion of how this could be achieved was made by
Ludwig Boltzmann (1877), and variants of it are currently regarded by
many as the most promising option among the plethora of approaches
to SM. Although these variants share a commitment to Boltzmann’s
basic ideas, they differ widely in how these ideas are implemented and
used. These differences become most tangible when we look at how
the different approaches deal with probabilities. There are two funda-
mentally different ways of introducing probabilities into SM, and even
within these two groups there are important disparities as regards both
technical and interpretational issues. The aim of this paper is to give
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a statement of these approaches and point out wherein their difficulties
lie.
3.2 Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
The state of a classical system of n particles with three degrees of free-
dom is completely specified by a point x = (r1,p1, ..., rn,pn) in its 6n
dimensional phase space Γ, where ri and pi are position and momentum,
respectively, of the ith particle.1 For reasons that will become clear soon
x, is referred to as the system’s (fine-grained) micro-state. Γ is endowed
with the ‘standard’ Lebesgue measure µ. Because we only consider sys-
tems in which the total energy is conserved and which have finite spatial
extension, only a finite region Γa ⊂ Γ is accessible to x.
We now assume that dynamics of the system is governed by Hamilton’s
equations, which define a measure preserving flow φt on Γ: for all times
t, φt : Γ → Γ is a one-to-one mapping and µ(R) = µ(φt(R)) for all
regions R ⊆ Γ.2 To indicate that we consider the image of a point x
under the dynamics of the system between two instants of time t1 and
t2 (where t1 < t2) I write ‘φt2−t1(x)’, and likewise for ‘φt2−t1(R)’. The
inverse is denoted by ‘φt1−t2(x)’ and provides the system’s state at time
t1 if its state was x at t2, and likewise for ‘φt1−t2(R)’.
It is one of the central assumptions of Bolzmannian SM (BSM) that
the system’s macro-states Mi, i = 1, ...,m (and m <∞) – characterised
by the values of macroscopic variables such as pressure, volume, and
temperature – supervene on the system’s macro-states, meaning that
a change in the macro-state must be accompanied by a change in the
micro-state. Hence the system’s micro-state uniquely determines the
system’s macro-state in that to every given x ∈ Γa there corresponds
exactly one macro-state, M(x). This determination relation is not one-
to-one as many different x can correspond to the same macro-state. It
1 For an introduction to classical mechanics see, for instance, Goldstein (1981) and
Abraham & Marsden (1980); Goldstein (2001), Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004),
and Lebowitz (1993a, 1993b, 1999) provide compact statements of the Boltzman-
nian approach to SM.
2 In a Hamiltonian system energy E is conserved and hence the motion of the
system is confined to the 6n-1 dimensional energy hypersurface ΓE defined by the
condition H(x) = E, where H(x) is the Hamiltonian of the system. Restricting µ
to ΓE yields a natural measure µE on this hypersurface. At some points in the
argument below it would be more appropriate to use µE rather than µ. However,
in the specific circumstances this would need some explaining and as none of the
conclusions I reach depend on this and I will not belabour this point further.
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is therefore natural to define the macro-region of Mi, ΓMi , as the subset
of Γa that consists of all micro-states corresponding to macro-state Mi:
ΓMi := {x ∈ Γa |Mi = M(x)}, i = 1, ...,m. (3.1)
The ΓMi together form a partition of Γa, meaning that they do not
overlap and jointly cover Γa: ΓMi ∩ ΓMj =  for all i 6= j and i, j =
1, ....m, and ΓM1 ∪ ... ∪ ΓMm = Γa, where ‘∪’, ‘∩’ and ‘’ denote set
theoretic union, intersection and the empty set respectively.
The Boltzmann entropy of a macro-state M is defined as
S
B
(M) = k
B
log[µ(ΓM )], (3.2)
whereM ranges over theMi and kB is the so-called Boltzmann constant.
The macro state for which S
B
is maximal is the equilibrium state, mean-
ing that the system is in equilibrium if it has reached this state.3 For the
sake of notational convenience we denote the equilibrium state by Meq
and choose, without loss of generality, the labelling of the macro-states
such that Mm =Meq.
Given this, we can define the Boltzmann entropy of a system at time
t as the entropy of the system’s macro-state at t:
S
B
(t) := S
B
(Mt), (3.3)
where Mt is the system’s macro-state at time t; i.e. Mt := M(x(t)),
where x(t) is the system’s micro-state at t.
It is now common to accept the so-called Past Hypothesis, the postu-
late that the system starts off at t0 in a low entropy macro-condition,
the ‘past state’ Mp (and we choose our labelling of macro-states such
that M1 = Mp). How the past state is understood depends one’s views
on the scope of SM. The grand majority of Boltzmannians take the sys-
tem under investigation to be the entire universe and hence interpret
the past state as the state of the of the universe just after the Big Bang
(I come back to this below). Those who stick to spirit of laboratory
physics, regard laboratory systems as the relevant unit of analysis and
see the past state as a one that is brought about in some particular
3 This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, Lavis (2005) has argued that
associating equilibrium with one macro-state is problematic for different reasons.
Second, that the equilibrium state is the macro-state with the highest Boltzmann
entropy is true only for non-interacting systems like ideal gases (Uffink 2006, Sec.
4.4)
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experimental situation (such as the gas being confined to the left half of
the room). For the discussion in this paper it is inconsequential which
of these views is adopted.
The leading idea of BSM is that the behaviour of S
B
(t) should mirror
the behaviour of the thermodynamic entropy S
TD
; that is, it should
increase with time t and reach its maximum at equilibrium. We should
not, however, expect that this mirroring be exact. The Second Law of
theormodynamics is a unversal law and says that S
TD
can never decrease.
A statistical theory cannot explain such a law and we have to rest content
if we explain the ‘Boltzmannian version’ of the Second Law (Callender
1999), also referred to as ‘Boltzmann’s Law’ (BL):
Consider an arbitrary instant of time t′ and assume that at that time the
Boltzmann entropy SB (t
′) of the system is low. It is then highly probable
that at any time t′′ > t′ we have SB (t
′′) ≥ SB (t′).
A system that behaves in accordance with BL is said to exhibit ‘ther-
modynamic like behaviour’ (TD-like behaviour, for short).
What notion of probability is invoked in BL and what reasons do we
have to believe that the claim it makes is true? Different approaches to
BSM diverge in how they introduce probabilities into the theory and in
how they explain the tendency of S
B
(t) to increase. The most fundamen-
tal distinction is between approaches that assign probabilities directly to
the system’s macro-states, and approaches that assign probabilities to
the system’s micro-state being in a particular subsets of the macro-region
corresponding to the system’s current macro-state; for want of better
terms I refer to these as ‘macro probabilities’ and ‘micro-probabilities’
respectively. I now present these approaches one at a time and examine
whether, and if so to what extent, they succeed in explaining BL.
Before delving into the discussion, let me list those approaches to prob-
ability that can be discounted straight away within the context BSM,
irrespective of how exactly probabilities are introduced into the theory.
The first three items on this list are the classical interpretation, the log-
ical interpretation and the so-called no-theory theory. These have not
been put forward as interpretations of Boltzmannian probabilities, and
this for good reasons. The first two simply are not the right kind of theo-
ries, while the no-theory does not seem to offer a substantial alternative
to either the propensity theory or David Lewis’ view (Frigg and Hoefer
2007). Frequentism, as von Mises himself pointed out, is problematic
as an interpretation of SM probabilities because, a sequence of results
that is produced by the same system does not satisfy the independence
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requirements of a collective (van Lith 2001, 587). Finally, a propensity
interpretation is ruled out by the fact that the underlying micro theory,
classical mechanics, is deterministic4, which is incompatible with there
being propensities (Clark 2001).
3.3 The Macro-Probability Approach
In this section I discuss Boltzmann’s (1877) proposal to assign proba-
bilities to the system’s macro-states and Paul and Tatiana Ehrenfest’s
(1912) view that these should be interpreted as time averages, based on
the assumption that the system is ergodic.
3.3.1 Introducing Macro-Probabilities
Boltzmann’s way of introducing probabilities into SM is intimately re-
lated to his construction of the macro-regions ΓMi , which is now also
known as the ‘combinatorial argument’.5 Assume now that the system
under investigation is a gas that consists of n molecules of the same type
and is confined to a finite volume V . Then consider the 6-dimensional
phase-space of one gas molecule, commonly referred to as µ-space. The
conservation of the total energy of the system and the fact that the gas is
confined to V results in only a finite part of the µ-space being accessible
to the particle’s state. Now put a grid-like partition on µ-space whose
cells all have the size δω and whose borders run in the directions of the
momentum and position axes. This results in the accessible region being
partitioned into a finite number of cells ωi, i = 1, ..., k. The state of the
entire gas can be represented by n points in µ-space, every one of which
comes to lie within a particular cell ωi. An ‘arrangement’ is a specifica-
tion of which point lies in which cell; i.e. it is a list indicating, say, that
the state of molecule 1 lies in ω9, the state of molecule 2 lies in ω13, and
so on. A ‘distribution’ is a specification of how many points (no matter
which ones) are in each cell; i.e. it is a k-tuple (n1, ..., nk), expressing
the fact that n1 points are in cell ω1, and so on. It then follows that
each distribution is compatible with
W (n1, . . . , nk) :=
n!
n1! . . . nk!
(3.4)
4 This is true of the systems studied in BSM; there are failures of determinism in
classical mechanics when we look at a larger class of systems (Earman 1986).
5 For a presentation and discussion of this argument see Uffink (2007, 974-893).
6 Probability in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
arrangements. Boltzmann then regards the probability p(n1, ..., nk) of a
distribution as determined by W (n1, . . . , nk):
‘The probability of this distribution is then given by the number of permu-
tations of which the elements of this distribution are capable, that is by the
number [W (n1, . . . , nk)]. As the most probable distribution, i.e. as the one
corresponding to thermal equilibrium, we again regard that distribution for
for which this expression is maximal [...]’ (Bolzmann 1877, 187)6
In other words, Boltzmann’s posit is that p(n1, ..., nk) is proportional to
W (n1, . . . , nk).
Macro-states are determined by distributions because the values of a
system’s macroscopic variables are fixed by the distribution. That is,
each distribution corresponds to a macro state.7 To simplify notation,
let us now assume that all distributions are labelled with an index i and
that there are m of them. Then there corresponds a macro-state Mi to
every distribution Di, i = 1, ...,m. This is sensible also from a formal
point of view because each distribution corresponds to a particular region
of Γ; regions corresponding to different distribution do not overlap and
all regions together cover the accessible parts of Γ (as we expect it to
be the case for macro-regions, see Section 3.2). One can then show that
the measure of each of each macro-region thus determined is given by
µ(ΓMi) =W (n1, . . . , nk) (δω)
n, (3.5)
where Di = (n1, . . . , nk) is the distribution corresponding to Mi.
This allows us to restate Boltzmann’s postulate about probabilities in
terms of the measures of the macro-regions ΓMi :
The probability of the probability of macro-state Mi is given by
p(Mi) = c µ(ΓMi), i = 1, ....,m, (3.6)
where c is a normalisation constant determined by the condition
∑m
i=1
p(Mi) =
1.
6 This and all subsequent quotes from Boltzmann are my own translations. Square
brackets indicate that Bolzmann’s notation has been replaced by the one used in
this paper. To be precise, in the passage here quoted ‘W ’ refers to distribution over
a partitioning of energy, not phase space. However, when Bolzmann discusses the
partitioning of µ-space a few pages further down (on p. 191) he refers the reader
back to his earlier discussions that occur on p. 187 (quoted) and p. 176. Hence
he endorses the posits made in this quote also for a partitioning of phase space.
7 It my turn out that it is advantageous in certain situations to regard two or more
distributions as belonging to the same macro-state (e.g. if the relevant macro
variables turn out to have the same values for all of them). As this would not
alter any of the considerations to follow, I disregard this possibility henceforth.
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I refer to this postulate as the ‘proportionality postulate’ and to prob-
abilities thus defined as ‘macro-probabilities’. The choice of the former
label is evident; the latter is motivated by the fact that the postulate as-
signs probabilities to the macro-states of the system and that the value of
these probabilities are determined by the measure of the corresponding
macro-region. It is a consequence of this postulate that the equilibrium
state is the most likely state.
Boltzmann does not provide an interpretation of macro-probabilities
and we will return to this problem below. Let us first introduce his
explanation of TD-like behaviour. The leading idea of Boltzmann’s ac-
count of non-equilibrium SM is to explain the approach to equilibrium
by a tendency of the system to evolve from an unlikely macro-state to a
more likely macro-state and finally to the most likely macro-state:
‘In most cases the initial state will be a very unlikely state. From this state
the system will steadily evolve towards more likely states until it has finally
reached the most likely state, i.e. the state of thermal equilibrium.’ (1877, 165)
‘[...] the system of bodies always evolves from a more unlikely to a more likely
state.’ (1877, 166)
In brief, Boltzmann’s answer to the question of how SM explains the
Second Law is that it lies in the nature of a system to move from states
of lower towards states of higher probability.
3.3.2 Macro-Probabilities Scrutinised
The question now is where this tendency to move towards more probable
states comes from. It does not follow from the probabilities themselves.
The p(Mi) as defined by Equation (3.6) are unconditional probabilities,
and as such they do not imply anything about the succession of macro-
states, let alone that ones of low probability are followed by ones of
higher probability. As an example consider a loaded die; the probability
to get a ‘six’ is 0.25 and all other numbers of spots have probability
0.15. Can we then infer that after, say, a ‘three’ we have to get a ‘six’
because the six is the most likely event? Of course not; in fact, we are
much more likely not to get a ‘six’. And the situation does not change
if, to make the scenario more like SM, the dice is so strongly biased that
getting a ‘six’ is by far the most likely event. If the probability for this
to happen is 0.999, say, then we are of course very likely to see a ‘six’
when throwing the die next, but this has nothing to do with the fact
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that we threw a ‘three’ before. The expectation that we move through
progressively more probable events on many rolls is simply a delusion.
A further (yet related) problem is that BL makes a statement about
a conditional probability, namely the probability of the system’s macro-
state at t′′, M(t′′), being such that S
B
(t′′) > S
B
(t′), given that the
system’s macro-state at an earlier time t′ was such that its Boltzmann
entropy was S
B
(t′). The probabilities of the proportionality postulate
are not of this kind. But maybe this mismatch is only apparent because
conditional probabilities can be obtained from unconditional ones by
using p(B|A) = p(B&A)/p(A), where A and B are arbitrary events
and p(A) > 0. The relevant probabilities then would be p(Mj |Mi) =
p(Mj &Mi)/p(Mi). Things are not that easy, unfortunately. Mj and
Mi are mutually exclusive (the system can only be either in Mj or Mi
but not in both) and hence the numerator of this relation is always zero.
The problem with this attempt is, of course, that it does not take time
into account. What we really would have to calculate are probabilities
of the form p(Mj at t′′ & Mi at t′)/p(Mi at t′). The problem is that it
is not clear how to do this on the basis of the proportionality postulate
as time does not appear in this postulate at all. One way around this
problem might be to slightly revise the postulate by building time de-
pendence into it: p(Mi at t) = c µ(ΓMi), i = 1, ....,m. But even if this
was justifiable, it would not fit the bill because it remains silent about
how to calculate p(Mj at t′′ & Mi at t′). In sum, the probabilities pro-
vided to us by the proportionality postulate are of no avail in explaining
BL.
This becomes also intuitively clear once we turn to the problem of in-
terpreting macro-probabilities. Boltzmann himself remains silent about
this question and the interpretation that has become the standard view
goes back to the Ehrenfests (1912). They suggest to interpret the p(Mi)
as time averages, i.e. as the fraction of time that the system spends in
ΓMi .
8 The equilibrium state, then, is the most probable state in the
sense that the system is most of time in equilibrium. Two things are
worth noticing about this interpretation. First, it makes it intuitively
clear why macro-probabilities cannot explain TD-like behaviour: from
the fact that the system spends a certain fraction of time in some macro-
state Mi, nothing follows about which state the system assumes after
leavingMi – time averages simply have no implications for the succession
8 Although time averages are, loosely speaking, the ‘continuum version’ of frequen-
cies, there are considerable differences between the two interpretations. For a
discussion of this point see von Plato (1988, 262-65; 1989 434-37).
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of states. Second, this interpretation needs to be justified by a particular
dynamical explanation; whether the time the system spends in a macro-
state is proportional to the volume of the corresponding macro-region,
depends on the dynamics of the system.
Of what kind does that dynamics have to be for a time average inter-
pretation to be possible? Again, Boltzmann himself remains silent about
the dynamical conditions necessary to backup his take on probability.9
The Ehrenfests (1912) fill this gap by attributing to him the view that
the system has to be ergodic. Roughly speaking, a system is ergodic on
Γa if for almost all trajectories, the fraction of time a trajectory spends
in a region R ⊆ Γa equals the fraction of the area of Γa that is occupied
by R.10 If the system is ergodic, it follows that the time that its actual
micro-state spends in each ΓMi is proportional to µ(ΓMi), which is what
we need.
This proposal suffers from various technical difficulties having to do
with the mathematical facts of ergodic theory. These problems are now
widely known and need not be repeated here.11 What needs to be noted
here is that even if all these problems could be overcome, we still would
not have explained BL because macro-probabilities, no matter how we
interpret them, are simply the wrong probabilities to explain TD-like
behaviour.12
Or would we? When justifying the time average interpretation we in-
troduced the assumption that the system is ergodic. Ergodicity implies
that a system that starts off in the past state sooner or later reaches equi-
librium and stays in equilibrium most of the time. Isn’t that enough to
rationalise BL? No it isn’t. What needs to be shown is not only that the
system sooner or later reaches equilibrium, but also that this approach to
equilibrium is such that the whenever the system’s macro-state changes
the entropy is overwhelmingly likely to increase. To date, no one suc-
ceeded in showing that anything of that kind follows from ergodicity
(or as Jos Uffink (2007, 981) puts the point, no proof of a statistical
9 And, as Uffink (2007, 981) points out, he reaffirmed later in 1881 that in he did
not wish to commit to any dynamical condition in his 1877 paper.
10 For a rigorous introduction to ergodic theory see Arnold and Avez (1968), and for
an account of its long and tangled history Sklar (1993, Chs. 2 and 5) and von
Plato (1994, Ch. 3).
11 See Sklar (1993, Ch. 5), Earman and Re´dei (1996) and van Lith (2001) for dis-
cussions.
12 In line with the majority of Boltzmannians I here frame the problem of SM as
explaining why entropy increases when a system is prepared in a low entropy state.
Lavis (2005, 254-61) criticises this preoccupation with ‘local’ entropy increase as
misplaced and suggests that what SM should aim to explain is that the Boltzmann
entropy be close to its maximum most of the time.
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H-theorem on the basis of the ergodic hypothesis has been given yet).
And there are doubts whether such a proof is possible. Ergodicity is
compatible with a wide range of different dynamical laws and it is in
principle conceivable that there is a dynamical law that is such that
the system passes through different macro-states in an way that is non
TD-like. To rule this out (and thereby justify BL on the basis of the
ergodic hypothesis), one would have to show that the macro-state struc-
ture defined by the combinatorial argument is such that there exists no
ergodic system that passes these macro-states in non TD-like way. It
seems unlikely that there is an argument for this conclusion.
Even though ergodicity itself does not fit the bill, an important les-
son can be learned from these considerations, namely that the key to
understanding the approach to equilibrium lies in dynamical considera-
tions. Assume for a minute that ergodicity was successful in justifying
TD-like behavour. Then, the explanation of TD-like behaviour would
be entirely in terms of the dynamical properties of the system and the
structure of the macro-regions; it would be an account of why, given er-
godicity, the system visits the macro-states in the ‘right’ (i.e. TD-like)
order. The proportionality principle and the probabilities it introduces
would play no role in this; an explanation of the system’s behaviour
could be given without mentioning probabilities once. Of course, ergod-
icity is not the right condition, but the same would be the case for any
dynamical condition. What does the explaining is an appeal to features
of the system’s phase flow in relation to the partitioning of the phase
space into macro-regions ΓMi ; probabilities have simply become an idle
wheel.
3.4 The Micro-Probability Approach
David Albert (2000) proposed a different approach to probabilities in
BSM. In this section I discuss this approach and Barry Loewer’s sugges-
tion (2001, 2004) to understand these probabilities as Humean chances
in David Lewis’ (1986, 1994) sense.
3.4.1 Introducing Micro-Probabilities
We now assign probabilities not to the system’s macro-states, but to
measurable subsets of the macro-region corresponding to the system’s
macro-state at time t. For lack of a better term I refer to these prob-
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abilities as ‘micro-probabilities’. An obvious way of introducing micro-
probabilities is the so-called ‘Statistical Postulate’ (SP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. Then the probability at time t
that the system’s micro-state lies in A ⊆ ΓMt is pt(A) = µ(A)/µ(ΓMt).
Given this, we can now calculate the probabilities occurring in BL.13
Let Γ(+)Mt′ be the subset ΓMt′ consisting of all micro-states x that be-
tween t′ and t′′ evolved, under the dynamics of the system, into macro-
regions corresponding to macro-states of higher entropy: Γ(+)Mt′ := {x ∈
Mt′ | φt′′−t′(x) ∈ Γ+}, where Γ+ :=
⋃
Mi ∈M+ ΓMi and M+ := {Mi |
S
B
(Mi) ≥ SB (Mt′), i = 1, ...,m}. The probability that SB (t′′) ≥ SB (t′)
then is equal to pt′(Γ
(+)
Mt′
) = µ(Γ(+)Mt′ )/µ(ΓMt′ ).
For Boltzmann’s law to be true the condition that µ(Γ(+)Mt )/µ(ΓMt) ≥
1− ε, where ε is a small positive real number, must hold for all macro-
states. Whether or not this is the case in a particular system is a sub-
stantial question, which depends on the system’s dynamics. However,
even if it is, there is a problem. It follows from the time reversal invari-
ance of Hamilton’s equations of motion that if it is true that the system is
overwhelmingly likely to evolve towards a macro-state of higher entropy
in the future, it is also overwhelmingly likely to have evolved into the
current macro-state from a past macro-state M ′′ which also has higher
entropy.14
Albert (2000, 71-96) discusses this problem at length and suggests
fixing it by first taking the system under investigation to be the entire
universe and then adopting the so-called Past Hypothesis (PH), the
postulate that
‘[...] the world came into being in whatever particular low-entropy highly
condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential
procedures of cosmology will eventually present to us.’ (Albert 2000, 96).
This postulate is not without problems (see Winsberg (2004b) and Ear-
man (2006) for discussions), and those who accept it disagree about
its status in the theory (see Callender’s and Price’s contributions to
Hitchcock (2004), which present opposite views). I assume that these
issues can be resolved in one way or another and presuppose PH in what
13 The truth (or even plausibility) of SP as well as its ‘successor’, PHSP (discussed
below), depends on the dynamics of the system. I return to this issue in Section
3.4.4.
14 A point to this effect was first made by the Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1907; 1912,
32-34). However, their argument is based on an explicitly probabilistic model and
so its relevance to deterministic dynamical system is tenuous.
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follows. The problem with wrong retrodictions can then be solved, so
Albert suggests, by conditionalising on PH:
‘[...] the probability distribution that one ought to plug into the equations of
motion in order to make inferences about the world is the one that’s uniform,
on the standard measure, over those regions of the phase space of the world
which are compatible both with whatever it is that we may happen to know
about the present physical condition of the universe (just as the original pos-
tulate [SP]) and with the hypothesis that the original macrocondition of the
universe was the one associated with the big bang.’ (Albert 2000, 95-96)
From a technical point of view, this amounts to replacing SP with what
I call the ‘Past Hypothesis Statistical Postulate’ (PHSP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. SP is valid for the Past State
Mp, which obtains at time t0. For all times t > t0 the probability at time t
that the system’s micro-state lies in A is
pt(A|Rt) = µ(A ∩Rt)
µ(Rt)
(3.7)
where Rt := Mt ∩ φt−t0(Mp).
Again, whether or not BL is true given this postulate is a substantive
question having to do both with the construction of the macro-states
as well as the dynamics of the system; I will come back to this issue
below. Let us first turn to the question of how these probabilities can
be interpreted.
3.4.2 Humean Chance
The basis for Lewis’ theory of probability is the so-called Humean mo-
saic, the collection of all non-modal and non-probabilistic actual events
making up the world’s entire history (from the very beginning to the very
end) and upon which all other facts supervene. Lewis himself suggested
that the mosaic consists of space-time points plus local field quantities
representing material stuff. In a classical mechanical system the Humean
mosaic simply consist of the trajectory of the system’s micro-state in
phase space, on which the system’s macro-states supervene.
The next element of Lewis’ theory is a thought experiment. To make
this explicit – more explicit than it is in Lewis’ own presentation – I
introduce a fictitious creature, Lewis’ Demon. In contrast to human
beings who can only know a small part of the Humean mosaic, Lewis’
Demon knows the entire mosaic. The demon now formulates various
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deductive systems which make true assertions about what is the case,
and, perhaps, also about what the probability for certain events are.
Then the demon is asked to choose the best among these systems. The
laws of nature are the true theorems of this system and the chances
for certain events to occur are what the probabilistic laws of the best
system say they are (Lewis 1994, 480). Following Loewer (2004), I call
probabilities thus defined L-chances.
The best system is the one that strikes the best balance between
strength, simplicity and fit. The notions of strength and simplicity are
given to the demon and are taken for granted in this context, but the
notion of fit needs explicit definition. Every system assigns probabilities
to certain courses of history, among them the actual course; the fit of the
system is measured by the probability that it assigns to the actual course
of history, i.e. by how likely it regards the things to happen that actually
do happen. By definition systems that do not involve probabilistic laws
have perfect fit. As an illustration, consider a Humean mosaic that
consists of just ten outcomes of a coin flip: HHTHTTHHTT. Theory
T1 posits that all events are independent and sets p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5;
theory T2 shares the independence assumption but posits p(H) = 0.9 and
p(T ) = 0.1. It follows that T1 has better fit than T2 because (0.5)10 >
(0.1)5(0.9)5.
Loewer’s suggestion is that BSM as introduced above – the package of
classical mechanics, PH and PHSP – is a putative best system of the sort
just described and that PHSP probabilities can therefore be regarded as
Humean chances:
‘Recall that (in Albert’s formulation) the fundamental postulates of statistical
mechanics are fundamental dynamical laws (Newtonian in the case of classical
statistical mechanics), a postulate that the initial condition was one of low
entropy, and the postulate that the probability distribution at the origin of
the universe is the microcanonical distribution conditional on the low entropy
condition. The idea then is that this package is a putative Best System of our
world. The contingent generalisations it entail are laws and the chance state-
ments it entails give the chances. It is simple and enormously informative. In
particular, it entails probabilistic versions of all the principles of thermody-
namics. That it qualifies as a best system for a world like ours is very plausible.
By being part of the Best System the probability distribution earns its status
as a law and is thus able to confer lawfulness on those generalisations that
it (together with the dynamical laws) entails.’ (Loewer 2001, 618; cf. 2004,
1124)
There is an obvious problem with this view, namely that it assigns
non-trivial probabilities (i.e. ones that can have values other than 0
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and 1) to events within a deterministic framework, which Lewis him-
self thought was impossible (1986, 118). Loewer claims that Lewis was
wrong on this and suggests that introducing probabilities via initial con-
ditions solves the problem of reconciling determinism and chance:
‘[...] while there are chances different from 0 and 1 for possible initial condi-
tions the chances of any event A after the initial time will be either 1 or 0 since
A’s occurrence or non-occurrence will be entailed by the initial state and the
deterministic laws. However, we can define a kind of dynamical chance which
I call ‘macroscopic chance’. The macroscopic chance at t of event A is the
probability given by starting with the micro-canonical distribution over the
initial conditions and then conditionalising on the entire macroscopic history
of the world (including the low entropy postulate) up until t. [...] this prob-
ability distribution is completely compatible with deterministic laws since it
concerns only the initial conditions of the universe.’ (Loewer 2001, 618-19; cf.
2004, 1124)
Loewer does not tell us what exactly he means by ‘a kind of dynamical
chance’, in what sense this chance is macroscopic, how its values are
calculated, and how it connects to the technical apparatus of SM. I will
now present how I think this proposal is best understood and show that,
on this reading, Loewer’s ‘macroscopic chances’ coincide with PHSP as
formulated above.
As above, I take the system’s state at t > t0 to be the macro-state
Mt. We now need to determine the probability of the event ‘being in
set A ⊆ ΓMt at time t’. As I understand it, Loewer’s proposal falls into
two parts. The first is that the probability of an event at a time t is
‘completely determined’ by the probability of the corresponding event
at time t0; that is, the probability of the event ‘being in set A at time
t’, pt(A), is equal to the probability of ‘being in set A0 at time t0’ where
A0 is, by definition, the set that evolves into A under the dynamics
of the system after time t has elapsed. Formally, pt(A) = µ0(A0) =
µ0(φt0−t(A)), where µ0 is the microcanonical distribution over the Past
State, i.e. µ0( · ) = µ( · ∩ ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp)
The second part is ‘conditionalising on the entire macrosccopic history
of the world [...] up to time t’. Loewer does not define what he means
by ‘macroscopic history’, but it seems natural to take a macro-history
to be a specification of the system’s macro-state at every instant of time
between t0 and t. A possible macro-history, for instance, would be that
system is in macro-state M1 during the interval [t0, t1], in M5 during
(t1, t2], in M7 during (t2, t3], etc., where t1 < t2 < t3 < ... are the
instants of time at which the system changes from one macro-state into
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another. What we are now expected to calculate is the probability of
‘being in set A at time t’ given the system’s macro-history. Let Qt be
the set of all micro-states in ΓMt that are compatible with the entire
past history of the system; i.e. it is the set of all x ∈ ΓMt that lie on
trajectories that for every t were in the ΓMk corresponding to the actual
macro-state of the system at t. The sought-after conditional probability
then is pt(A|Qt) = pt(A&Qt)/pt(Qt), provided that pt(Qt) 6= 0, which,
as we shall see, is the problematic condition.
Putting these two parts together we obtain the fundamental rule in-
troducing L-chances for deterministic systems, which I call the L-chance
statistical postulate (LSP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. SP is valid for the Past State
Mp, which obtains at t0. For all times t > t0 the probability that the system’s
micro-state lies in A is
pt(A|Qt) = µ0(φt0−t(A ∩Qt))
µ0(φt0−t(Qt))
, (3.8)
where Qt is the subset of Mt of micro-states compatible with the entire past
history of the system and, again, µ0( · ) = µ( · ∩ ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp).
The crucial thing to realise now is that due to the conservation of
the Liouville measure the expression for the conditional probability in
PHSP can be expressed as pt(A|Rt) = µ(φt0−t(A ∩ Rt))/µ(φt0−t(Rt)).
Trivially, we can substitute µ0 for µ in this expression which makes it
is formally equivalent to Equation 3.8. Hence PHSP can be interpreted
as attributing probabilities to events at t > t0 solely on the basis of
the microcanonical measure over the initial conditions, which is what
Loewer needs.
However, the equivalence of PHSP and LSP is only formal because
there is an important difference between Qt and Rt: Rt only involves
a conditionalisation on PH, while Qt contains the entire past history.
This difference will be important below.
3.4.3 Problems with Fit
Loewer claims that BSM as introduced above is the system that strikes
the best balance between simplicity, strength and fit. Trivially, this
implies that BSM can be ranked along these three dimensions. Simplic-
ity and strength are no more problematic in SM than they are in any
other context and I shall therefore not discuss them further here. The
problematic concept is fit.
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The fit of a theory is measured in terms of the probability it assigns
to the actual course of history. But what history? Given that L-chances
are calculated using the Lebesgue measure, which assigns measure zero
to any trajectory, they do not lead to a non-trivial ranking of micro
histories (trajectories in Γ). The right choice seems to be to judge the
fit of theory with respect to the system’s macro-history.
What is the probability of a macro-history? A first answer to this
question would be to simply use Equation (3.8) to calculate the proba-
bility of a macro state at each instant of time and then multiply them all,
just as we did in the above example with the coins (with the only differ-
ence that the probabilities are now not independent any more, which is
accounted for in Equation 3.8). Of course, this is plain nonsense. There
is an uncountable infinity of such probabilities and multiplying an un-
countable infinity of numbers is an ill-defined operation. Determining
the probability of a history by multiplying probabilities for the individ-
ual events in the history works fine as long as the events are discrete
(like coin flips) but if fails when we have a continuum.
Maybe this was too crude a stab at the problem and when taking
the right sorts of limits things work out fine. Let us discretise time
by dividing the real axis into small intervals of length δ, then calculate
the probabilities at the instants t0, t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ etc., multiply them
(there are only countably many now), and then take the limit δ → 0.
This would work if the pt(A|Qt) depended in a way on δ that would
assure that the limit exists. This is not the case. And, surprisingly, the
problem does not lie with the limit. It turns out that for all t > t1 (i.e.
after the first change of macro-state), the pt(A|Qt) do not exist because
Qt has measure zero, and this irrespective of δ. This can be seen as
follows. Take the above example of a macro-history and consider an
instant t ∈ (t1, t2] when the system is in macro-state M5. To calculate
the probability of the system being in M5 at t we need to determine
Qt, the set of all micro-states in ΓM5 compatible with the past macro
history. Now, these points must be such that they were were in M1 at
t1 and in M5 just an instant later (i.e. for any ε > 0, at t1 + ε the
system’s state is in ΓM5). The mechanical systems we are considering
have global solutions (or at least solutions for the entire interval [t0, tf ],
where tf is the time when the system ceases to exist) and trajectories
in such systems have finite phase velocity; that is, a phase point x in Γ
cannot cross a finite distance in no time. From this it follows that the
only points that satisfy the condition of being in M1 at t1 and in M5
just instant later are the ones that lie exactly on the boundary between
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M1 and M5. But the boundary of a 6n dimensional region is 6n − 1
dimensional and has measure zero. Therefore Qt has measure zero for
all t > t1, and accordingly pt(A|Qt) does not exist for t > t1, no matter
what A. Needless to say, this renders the limit δ → 0 obsolete.
The source of these difficulties seems to be Loewer’s requirement that
we conditionalise on the entire macro-history of the system. This sug-
gests that the problem can be solved simply by reverting back to Albert’s
algorithm, which involves only conditionalising on PH. Unfortunately
the hope that this would make the problems go away is in vane. First,
Loewer seems to be right that we need to conditionalise on the entire
macro-history when calculating the fit of a system. Fit is defined as
the probability that the system attributes to the entire course of actual
history and hence the probability of an event at time t must take the
past into account. It can turn out to be the case that the evolution of
a system is such that this probability of an event at t is independent of
(large parts of the) past of the system, in which case we need not take
the past into account. But if certain conditional probabilities do not
exist given the system’s past, we cannot simply ‘solve’ the problem by
ignoring it.
Second, even if one could somehow convincingly argue that condition-
alising on the entire past is indeed the wrong thing to do, this would not
be the end of the difficulties because another technical problem arises,
this time having to do with the limit. As above, let us discretise time by
dividing the real axis into small intervals of length δ and calculate the
relevant probabilities at the instants t0, t0+ δ, t0+2δ etc. The relevant
probabilities are of the form p(t′, t′′) := p(Mj at t′′|Mi at t′&Mp at t0),
where t′ and t′′ are two consecutive instances on the discrete time axis
(i.e. t′′ > t′ and t′′ − t′ = δ), and Mi and Mj are the system’s macro-
states at t′ and t′′ respectively. Calculating these probabilities using
PHSP we find:
p(t′, t′′) =
µ[φt′−t′′(ΓMj ) ∩ ΓMi ∩ φt′−t0(ΓMp)]
µ[ΓMi ∩ φt′−t0(ΓMp)]
. (3.9)
These probabilities exist and we then obtain the probability of the actual
course of history by plugging in the correctMi’s and multiply all of them.
The next step is to take the limit δ → 0, and this is where things go
wrong. We need to distinguish two cases. First, the system is in the same
macro-state at t′ and t′′ (i.e. Mi =Mj). In this case it limδ→0 p(t′, t′′) =
1 because limδ→0 φt′−t′′(ΓMi) = ΓMi . Second, the system is in two
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different macro-states at t′ and t′′. In this case limδ→0 p(t′, t′′) = 0
because limδ→0 φt′−t′′(ΓMj ) = ΓMj and, by definition, ΓMj ∩ ΓMi = .
Hence the product of all these probabilities always comes out zero in
the limit, and this for any phase flow φ and for any macro-history that
involves at least one change of macro-state (i.e. for any macro history in
which the system ever assumes a state other than the past state). Fit,
calculated in this way, fails to put different systems into a non-trivial fit
ordering and is therefore useless.
The moral to draw from this is that we should not take the limit and
instead calculate fit with respect to a finite number of instants of time;
that is, we should calculate fit with respect to a discrete macro history
(DMH) rather than a continuous one. By a DMH I mean a specification
for a finite number of instants of time t0 =: τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤ ... ≤ τj−1 ≤ τj :=
tf (which can but need not be equidistant as the ones we considered
above) of the system’s macro-state at these instants: Mp at τ0, Mτ1 at
τ1,Mτ2 at τ2, ...,Mτj at τj−1 andMτj at τj , where theMτi the system’s
macro state at time τi.15
Before discussing the consequences of this move further, let me point
out that once we go for this option, the seeming advantage of condition-
alising only on PH rather than the entire past history evaporates. If we
only consider the system’s macro-states at discrete times, Qt no longer
needs to have measure zero. As a result, the probabilities introduced in
Equation (3.8) are well defined. So, conditinalising on the entire past is
no problem as long as the relevant history is discrete.
How could we justify the use of a discrete rather than a continuous
macro-history? We are forced into conditionalising over a continuum of
events by the conjunction of three assumptions: (1) the posit that time
is continuous, (2) the assumption that the transition from one macro-
state to another one takes place at a precise instant, (3) the posit that
fit has to be determined with respect to the entire macro-history of the
system.16 We have to give up at least one of these to justify the use of
a discrete rather than a continuous macro-history. The problem is that
15 I assume j to be finite. There is a further problem with infinite sequences (Elga
2004). The difficulties I discuss in this section and the next are independent of
that problem.
16 To be precise, there is a fourth assumption, namely that the relevant measure is
the Lebesgue measure on the 6n− 1 dimensional energy hypersurface. Maybe the
problem could be avoided by using a different measure. However, it is not clear
which measure this would be and how to justify the use of a measure other than
the natural measure on ΓE .
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all three elements either seem reasonable or are deeply entrenched in the
theory and cannot be renounced without far-reaching consequences.
The first option, discretising time, would solve the problem because if
we assume that time is discrete the macro-history is discrete too. The
problem with this suggestion is that it is ad hoc (because time in classical
mechanics is continuous), and therefore defeats the purpose of SM. If we
believe that classical mechanics is the fundamental theory governing the
micro constituents of the universe and set out to explain the behaviour
of the universe in terms of its laws, not much seems to be gained if such
an explanation can only be had at the expense of profoundly modifying
these laws.
The second suggestion would be to allow for finite transition times
between macro-states; that is, allowing for there to be periods of time
during which it is indeterminate in which macro-state the system is.
This suggestion is not without merit as one could argue that sharp tran-
sitions between macro-states are indeed a mathematical idealisation that
is ultimately unjustifiable from a physics perspective. However, sharp
transitions are a direct consequence of the postulate that macro-states
supervene on micro-states. This postulate is central to the Boltzman-
ninan approach and it is not clear how it could be given up without
unsettling the entire edifice of BSM.
The third option denies that we should conditionalise on the complete
macro-history. The idea is that even though time at bottom is contin-
uous, the macro-history takes record of the system’s macro-state only
at discrete instants and is oblivious about what happens between these.
This is at once the most feasible and the most problematic suggestion.
It is feasible because it does not require revisions in the structure of the
theory. It is problematic because we have given up the notion that the
fit of a theory has to be best with respect to the complete history of the
world, and replaced it with the weaker requirement that fit be best for
a partial history.17 From the point of view of Lewis’ theory this seems
unmotivated. Fit, like truth, is a semantic concept characterising the
relation between the theory and the world, and if the Humean mosaic
has continuous events in it there should still be a matter of fact about
what the fit of the theory is.
Moreover, even if one is willing to believe that a discrete version of
17 And mind you, the point is not that the fit of the full history is in practice too
complicated to calculate and we therefore settle for a more tractable notion; the
point is that the fit of a complete macro-history is simply not defined because the
relevant conditional probabilities do not exist.
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fit is satisfactory, it is not clear whether this leads to useful results.
Depending on which particular instants of time one chooses to measure
fit, one can get widely different results. These would be useful only if
it was the case that the fit rankings came out the same no matter the
choice of instants. There is at least a question whether this is the case.
3.4.4 The Putative Best System Is Not the Best System
I now assume, for the sake of argument, that the use of a DMH to
calculate fit can be defended in one way or another. Then a further
problem emerges: the package consisting of Hamiltonian Mechanics, PH
and PHSP in fact is not the best system. The reason for this is that
we can always improve the fit of a system if we choose a measure that,
rather than being uniform over ΓMp , is somehow peaked over those initial
conditions that are compatible with the entire DMH.
Let us make this more precise. As above, I first use Loewer’s scheme
and then discuss how conditionalising a` la Albert would change mat-
ters. The probability of the DMH is p(DMH) = pτ0(Aτ0 |Qτ0) ...
pτj−1(Aτj−1 |Qτj−1), where the Aτi are those subsets of Mτi that evolve
into Mτi+1 under the evolution of the system between τi and τi+1. One
can then prove that
p(DMH) = µ0[Γp ∩ φτ0−τ1(Γ1) ∩ ... ∩ φτ0−τj (Γj)] (3.10)
where, for ease of notation, we set Γp := ΓMp and Γi := ΓMτi for
i = 1, ..., j. Now define N := Γp ∩ φτ0−τ1(Γ1) ... φτ0−τj (Γj). The fit of
system is measured by the probability that it assigns to the actual DMH,
which is given by Equation (3.10). It is a straightforward consequence
of this equation that the fit of a system can be improved by replacing
µ0 by a measure µP that is peaked over N , i.e. µP (N) > µ0(N) and
µP (Γp \N) < µ0(Γp \N) while µP (Γp) = µ0(Γp). Fit becomes maximal
(i.e. p(DMH) = 1) if, for instance, we choose the measure µN that
assigns all the weight to N and none to Γp\N : µN (A) := kµ0(A∩N), for
all sets A ⊆ Γp and k = 1/µ0(N) (provided that µ0(N) 6= 0). Trivially,
N contains the actual initial condition of the unverse. An even simpler
and more convenient distributions that yields maximal fit is a Dirac
delta function over the actual initial condition.
If there is such a simple way to improve (and even maximise) fit,
why does the demon not provide us with a system comprising µN or a
delta function? Coming up with such a system is not a problem for the
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demon, as, by assumption, he knows the entire Humean mosaic. One
reason to prefer µ0 to other measures might be that these make the
system less simple and that this loss in simplicity is not compensated
by a corresponding gain in fit and strength. This seems implausible.
Handling µN or a dirac delta function rather than µ0 does not render
the system much more complicated while the gain in fit is considerable.
Hence simplicity does not seem to provide reason to prefer µ0 to other
measures that have better fit.
This conclusion can be opposed on various grounds. The first is that
the introduction of alternative distributions makes the system radically
more complex and hence on balance the original system is better. Con-
sider the delta function first, and assume for the sake of argument that
ΓMp is a (6n−1 dimensional) interval. A counter to my claim then would
be that the system with the delta function is complex because it has to
store a number – the true initial condition – which is computationally
costly because most numbers have decimal expansions that are infinitely
long. By contrast, intervals can be stored cheaply; all the system has to
store is something like ‘the unit interval’.
This argument is unconvincing because it relies on a misleading choice
of examples. A specification of an interval demands the specification of
two numbers, the interval’s boundaries. These can, of course, be natural
numbers (and hence cheap to store), but this need not be the case; the
boundaries of an interval can be real numbers. Moreover, it can also be
the case that the true initial condition is a natural number, and hence
cheap to store. So the bottom line is that storing an interval requires
storing two numbers, while storing an initial condition only requires stor-
ing one number, and hence the claim that the system with the interval
is simpler is unwarranted. Finally, this still leaves the question what
happens if ΓMp is not an interval. Things are less clear in that case, but
arguably storing a complicated boundary is more costly than storing a
single number.
What about a distribution peaked over N? The argument against this
is that specifying N is more complicated than specifying ΓMp because
the latter is given to us directly by the system’s macro-state structure,
while the former has to be determined on the basis of the entire Humean
mosaic in an extra step. While this is true, it does not seem to be correct
to say that this is an ‘extra’ in the sense that it involves carrying out a
step that we would not otherwise have to carry out. As becomes clear
from Equation (3.10), in determining the fit of the system we effectively
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determine N , and there is no way around determining the system’s fit.
So there is no extra work involved in determining N .
Another line of criticism claims the the gain in fit is not, as the above
argument assumes, considerable.18 In fact, so the argument goes, the
original system has already extremely good fit and fiddling around with
the measure would result at best in a small improvement of fit; and
this small improvement is not enough to compensate the loss in sim-
plicity which is involved in using distributions other than original one.
Therefore, the system containing µ0 is the best system after all.
I have already argued that I don’t think that the use of alternative
distributions makes the system more complex, but this criticism draws
our attention to an important point well worth discussing, namely the
absence of a specification in the putative best system of the Hamiltonian
of the universe.19 Assume that the macro history of the universe is
indeed TD-like in that the entropy increases most of the time. Why then
should we assume that the system consisting of Hamiltonian mechanics,
PH and either PHSP or LSP has good fit? Whether or not this is the
case depends on the dynamical properties of the Hamiltonian of the
system. The phase flow φ – the solution of the equations of motion –
explicitly occurs both in Equations (3.7) and (3.8) and hence whether
these probabilities come out such that the system has good fit with
the actual history depends on the properties of φ. In fact, we cannot
calculate any probabilities at all if we don’t have φ! Without a phase
flow both PHSP and LSP remain silent and it is absolutely essential that
we are told what φ to plug into the probabilistic algorithms if we want
to obtain any results at all. So it is somewhat puzzling that Loewer does
not say anything about φ at all and Albert (2000, 96) completely passes
over it in his definitive statement of his view (he says something about
it at another place; I come back to this below).
We are now faced with the situation that we have to plug some φ
into to either PHSP or LSP in order to make predictions, and at the
same time we are not told anything about which φ to take. One way
out of this predicament would be to assume that any φ would do. That
18 Thanks to Eric Winsberg for a helpful discussion on this issue.
19 Albert and Loewer regard Newtonian rather than Hamiltonian mechanics as part
of the best system. Newtonian mechanics has a wider scope that Hamiltonian
mechanics in that it allows also for dissipative force functions. However, such
force functions do not occur in SM, where forces are assumed to be conservative.
But the motions to which such forces give rise are more elegantly described by
Hamilton mechanics. Hence I keep talking about Hamiltonian mechanics in what
follows, which is not a drawback because the problems I describe would only be
aggravated by considering full-fledged Newtonian mechanics.
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is, the claim would be that every classical system with PH and either
PHSP or LSP behaves in such a way that the actual history comes out
having high fit. This, however, is wrong. Whether a system behaves in
this way, and whether the system has good fit with the actual history
of the world, essentially depends both on the dynamics of the system
and the structure of the macro-regions. Some Hamiltonians don’t give
rise to an approach to equilibrium at all (e.g. a system of harmonic
oscillators), and others may have constants of motion whose invariant
surfaces prevent the system from moving into certain regions of phase
space into which it would have to move for the macro-history to be what
it is.
Hence, the best system cannot possibly consist only of the above three
elements; it also has to contain a specification of the macro-state struc-
ture and a Hamiltionian (from which we obtain φ by solving the equa-
tions of motion). If we assume the macro-state structure to be given by
the combinatorial argument, then the challenge is to present a Hamilto-
nian (or a class of Hamiltonians) for which the fit of the system is high.
How would such Hamiltonian look like?
Two criteria emerge from Albert’s discussion. The first and obvious
condition is that φ must be such that the probabilities calculated using
PHSP come out right. The second, somewhat more involved, require-
ment is that φ be such that ‘abnormal’ microstates (i.e. ones that lead
to un-thermodynamic behaviour) are scattered in tiny clusters all over
the macro-regions (2000, 67, 81-85). The motivation for this condition is
subtle and need not occupy us here; a detailed discussion can be found in
Winsberg (2004a). Two things about these conditions are remarkable.
First, Albert’s discussion of these conditions suggest that they are tech-
nicalities that at some point have to be stated for completeness’ sake and
then can be put aside; in other words, his discussion suggests (although
he does not say this explicitly) that these are simple conditions that
hold true in all classical systems and once this fact is noticed we do not
have to worry about them any more. This might explain why neither
of them is mentioned in the final statement of his view (2000, 96). This
is misleading. These conditions are extremely special and many phase
flows do not satisfy them. So it is very much an open question whether
the Hamiltonians of those systems – in particular the universe as a whole
– to which SM reasoning is applied satisfy these requirements.
To this one might reply that there is a sort of a transcendental ar-
gument for the conclusion that the Hamiltonian of the universe indeed
must belong to this class of Hamiltonians, because if it did not then
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the universe simply would not be what it is and thermodynamics would
not be true in it. The problem, and this is the second point, with this
suggestion is that even if this argument was sound, it would not solve
the original problem, namely that we cannot calculate any probabilities
at all if we don’t have φ. The fact that the Hamiltonian of the universe
satisfies all required criteria does not tell us what this Hamiltonian – or
the phase flow φ associated with it – is, and as long as we don’t have the
Hamiltonian we simply cannot use either PHSP or LSP. Hence a system
that does not contain the Hamiltonian of the universe is not really a
system at because the probabilistic algorithms require the phase flow φ
of the universe to be given.
As it stands we don’t know what φ is and hence the package of classical
mechanics, PH and either PHSP or LSP fails to produce any predictions
at all. But assume now, again for the sake of argument, that we somehow
manage to get hold of the Hamiltonian (and can also solve the equations
of motion so that we obtain φ). We could then say that the best sys-
tem consists of Hamiltonian mechanics including the Hamiltonian of the
universe, PH, the macrostate structure given by the combinatorial argu-
ment and a probabilistic algorithm. Before we can make this suggestion
definitive we need to settle the question of which probabilistic algorithm
to include. PHSP or LSP? There is again a trade-off between simplicity
and fit. On the one hand, PHSP is simpler than LSP because condi-
tionalising on just the past state is simpler than conditionalising on the
entire discrete macro history up to time t. On the other hand, LSP
will generally yield better predictions than PHSP and hence make the
system stronger. Whether on balance PHSP or LSP is the better choice
depends, again, on φ. It might be that the dynamics is so friendly that
Rt and Qt coincide, in which case PHSP is preferable on the grounds
of simplicity. If this is not the case, then LSP may well be the better
choice. Depending which one comes out as striking the better balance,
we add either PHSP or LSP to the above list. This then is our putative
system.
Before raising a more fundamental objection against the view that
the above quintet is a best system in the relevant sense, let me voice
some scepticism about this line of defence against the original charge
that fit can always be improved by substituting µ0 by a measure like
µN . The past state is defined solely via the value of some relevant
macro parameters and the corresponding macro-region, ΓMp , consists
of all micro-states that are compatible with these values. In particular
no facts about the behaviour of the x ∈ ΓMp under the time evolution
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of the system is made. Now it would be something of a miracle if the
overwhelming majority points (relative to the Lebesgue measure) in a
set thus defined would be the initial conditions of trajectories that are
compatible with the actual course of history. We would have to have a
very good and very special reason to assume that this is the case, and so
far we do not have such a reason. And I doubt that there there are. For
the approach to equilibrium to take place the system needs to be chaotic
in some way , and such system involve divergence of nearby trajectories.
For this reason it is plausible to assume that different x in ∈ ΓMp evolve
into very different parts of phase space and thereby move through very
different macro-regions, and hence give rise to different macro-histories.
And for this reason using µN rather than µ0 would improve fit.
There is a more fundamental objection to the view that the quintet
of Hamiltonian mechanics, PH, the combinatorial macrostate structure,
a Hamiltonian satisfying some relevant condition and, say, LSP is a
best system in Lewis’ sense. The point is that a system that does not
contain probabilities at all is much simpler than one that does, at least if
probabilities are introduced either by PHSP or LSP. The laws are made
by Lewis’ demon and in the deterministic world of classical mechanics,
the simplest system that the demon can come up with is one that consists
of Hamilton’s equations together with the Hamiltonian of the system,
the macro-state structure, and the exact initial condition – everything
else follows from this. In other words, simply adding the true initial
condition as an axiom to mechanics and the macro-state structure is
much simpler than adding probabilities via either PHSP or SPP – and
doing this is no problem for the demon as he knows the exact initial
condition.
Before arguing for this let me locate the moot point. It is important
to be clear on the fact that the ability to solve equations is irrelevant
to the argument, because both PHSP and LSP presuppose a solution to
the equations of motion, because the phase flow φ, which is the solution
of he equations of motion, explicitly figures both in Equations (3.7) and
(3.8).20 In this respect systems comprising PHSP or LSP are not simpler
than the a system containing the exact initial condition as an axiom. So
the controversy must be over the computational costs of handling initial
conditions. The argument, then, must go something like this: having
20 Notice that this is a very strong, and entirely unrealistic, assumption. Character-
istically we do not have solutions to the equations of motion of systems studied in
SM, and many physicist see this as the motivation to use statistical considerations
to begin with (see for instance Khinchin 1949).
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the laws and relevant macro information is much simpler than knowing
an initial condition, because storing an initial condition involves storing
about 6n real numbers, which is costly because one has to take it in
(presumably feed it into a computer), store it, and later on process it,
which takes time and storage space and hence comes at a high cost of
simplicity.
This is an illusion, which stems from the ambiguous use of ‘macro in-
formation’. Macro information – knowledge about the values of macro-
scopic parameters such as pressure and volume – about the past state is
useless when we want to apply, say, PHSP. What goes into this proba-
bilistic algorithm is not macro information per se; it is the set of micro-
states compatible with the available macro information. Once this is
realised, the apparent advantage of a system containing probabilities
evaporates because taking in and storing information about an entire
set is more costly than taking in and storing a single point. This is be-
cause specifying a set in 6n dimensional space at least implies specifying
its boundary, and this amounts to specifying a 6n−1 dimensional hyper-
surface, containing infinitely many points. And when applying PHSP
we have evolve forward in time this entire surface, which involves evolv-
ing forward in time infinitely many points. How could that possibly be
simpler than taking in, storing, and evolving forward one single point?
In sum, there are strong prima facie reasons to assume that the sys-
tem’s fit can be improved by changing the initial measure. And even
should it turn out that this is not the case, a system without proba-
bilities would be better than one with probabilities. Therefore, neither
PHSP nor LSP probabilities can be interpreted as Humean chances.
3.4.5 Interpreting BSM Probabilities
Where does this leave us? I think that the above considerations make it
plausible that what ultimately gives rise to the introduction of probabil-
ities into classical mechanics are the epistemic limitations of those who
use the theory. All we can know about a system is its macro-state and
hence we put a probability distribution over the micro-states compatible
with that macro-state, which then reflects our lack of knowledge.
How these epistemic probabilities should be understood is a ques-
tion that needs to be further discussed. Here I can only hint at two
possibilities. The first, a version of objective Bayesianism, appeals to
Jaynes’ maximum entropy principle, which indeed instructs us to pre-
fer µ0 to alternative measures because, given the information about the
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system’s macro state, µ0 maximises the (continuous) Shannon entropy.
The other alternative is to revise Lewis’ account in a way that builds
epistemic restrictions of the users of theories into systems. Hoefer’s
(2007) theory of Humean chance seems to make room for this possibil-
ity. This option should not scandalise the Humean. The bedrock of
contemporary Humeanism as regards probability is the rejection of a
metaphysical grounding of probabilities in propensities, tendencies, dis-
positions, or the like. At the same time the Humean regards probabilities
as linked to human beliefs by the so-called Principal Principle, roughly
the proposition that our subjective probabilities for an event to happen
should match what we take to be its objective chance. Hence, for the
Humean probabilities are both non-metaphysical and closely linked to
beliefs. Hence, per se, the fact that SM probabilities have an epistemic
component is no reason for outrage.
There are two main complaints about an epistemic interpretation of
SM probabilities. The first21 points out that the thermodynamic en-
tropy is a property of a physical system and that SB coincides with it
up to a constant. This, so the argument goes, is inexplicable on the
basis of an epistemic approach to probabilities. This argument has in-
deed some force when put forward against the Gibbs entropy if the SM
probabilities are given an ignorance interpretation, because the Gibbs
entropy is defined in terms of the probability distribution of the system.
However, it has no force against an epistemic interpretation of PHSP or
LSP probabilities simply because these probabilities do not occur in the
Boltzmann entropy, which is defined in terms of the measure of certain
chunks of phase space (see Equation (3.2)). Probabilities have simply
nothing to do with it.
Another frequently heard objection is a complaint about the alleged
causal efficacy of human knowledge. The point becomes clear in the
following – rhetorical – questions by Albert:22
‘Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary, that it is somehow
a priori, that the particles that make up the material world must arrange
themselves in accord with what we know, with what we happen to have looked
into? Can anybody seriously think that our merely being ignorant of the
exact microconditions of thermodynamic systems plays some part in bringing
21 This point is often made in conversation, but I have been unable to locate it in
print.
22 Redhead (1995, 27-28, 32-33), Loewer (2001, 611), Goldstein (2001, 48), and
Meacham (2005 287-8) essentially the same point.
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it about, in making it the case, that (say) milk dissolves in coffee? How could
that be?’ (Albert 2000, 64, original emphasis)23
It can’t be, and no one should think that it could. Proponents of epis-
temic probabilities need not believe in parapsychology, and therewith
regard knowledge of tea and coffee as causally relevant to their cooling
down.
What underlies this objection is the mistaken view that PHSP prob-
abilities play a part in bringing about things in the world. Of course
the cooling down of drinks and the boiling of kettles has nothing to do
with what anybody thinks or knows about them; but they have nothing
to do with the probabilities attached to these events either. Drinks cool
down and kettles boil because the universe’s initial condition is such that
under the dynamics of the system it evolves into a state in which this
happens. There is no causal connection between knowledge and happen-
ings in the world, and, at least in the context of classical SM, nothing
of that sort is suggested by an epistemic interpretation of probabilities.
We have now reached the same point as in the discussion of macro-
probabilities in the last section. All that is needed to explain why things
happen is the initial condition and the dynamics. Prima facie appear-
ances notwithstanding, neither PHSP nor LSP probabilities have any
role to play in explaining why a system behaves as it does. If these
probabilities come out as BL would have them, this is indicative, it is
a symptom, of the system behaving ‘thermodynamically’, but it is not
the cause for this behaviour.
3.5 Conclusion
I have discussed two different ways of introducing probabilities into BSM
and argued that the first one is irredeemably flawed, while the second
leads to probabilities that are best understood as having an epistemic
component. The discussion of both approaches have shown that there
is ‘blind spot’ in the litarature on BSM, namely dynamics. Too much
emphasis has been placed on probabilities and not enough attention has
been paid to the dynamical conditions that have to fall in place for a
23 This contrasts starkly with the epistemic language that Albert uses throughout
his discussion of PHSP. In the passages quoted above, for instance, he defines the
Past State as the one with which the ‘normal inferential procedures of cosmology
will eventually present us’ and when discussing conditionalising on PH he names
‘make inferences about the world’ as the aim and invites us to put a measure over
those regions that are compatible with ‘whatever it is that we happen to know
about the present physical condition of the universe’.
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system to behave TD-like. This puts two items on the agenda of future
discussions of BSM: we need to understand better the nature of the
epistemic probabilities used in SM an we need to study more carefully
the role that the dynamics of the system plays in explaining TD-like
behaviour.
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